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Robert R. Locke 
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII 
COST ACCOUNTING 
AN INSTITUTIONAL YARDSTICK FOR MEASURING 
BRITISH ENTREPRENEURAL PERFORMANCE, 
CIRCA 1914 
Abstract: This article, like that published in the spring issue, again finds fault with 
recent attempts by economic historians to rehabilitate the reputation of the late 
Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. It argues that, since after 1880 cost ac-
counting became a "necessary" technology for good entrepreneurial performance, 
the revisionist economic historians' failure to consider institutional factors, like 
cost accounting, has led them to overlook elements essential to an appraisal of 
comparative entrepreneurial performance. The growing inferiority of British cost-
ing methods, as opposed to American and German, moreover, meant a relative 
British entrepreneurial failure. 
In the first part of this essay, published in the spring issue, recent 
negative opinions about the quality of British entrepreneurial per-
formance, circa 1914, were criticized from a cost accounting point 
of view.1 In this article attention shifts to the institutional basis of 
entrepreneurial activity. Although the revisionists historians under 
discussion are ostensibly preoccupied with the entrepreneur they 
really have ignored the effect of environment upon his operations. 
They have done this, moreover, even when the results of their own 
studies indicate that the subject should be investigated. Roderick 
Floud, in his study of Greenwood and Batley, observed, for example, 
that the character of the company's accounting system 
makes it impossible to measure the capital inputs, and 
therefore, the cost of such inputs, making it impossible 
to approach directly either the extent of, or the cost of 
factor substitution in the form of the use of capital rather 
than labor.2 
If Floud could not measure these inputs could Greenwood & 
Batley? Floud never tries to answer such a question. This is un-
fortunate because, again as Floud noted, quoting a contemporary 
source, the firm's financial record was "simply disastrous."3 There 
is something incongruous about saying that a firm had, at the same 
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time, a disastrous financial and a good productivity record. The 
accounts should explain why and if they cannot then perhaps 
they might themselves be part of the problem.4 If they did not 
supply management with the right information, then management 
might be responsible for its own financial difficulties, despite, as-
suming Floud's conclusions to be correct, the firm's good productiv-
ity record. In other words the firm might be an example of inept 
instead of good management, the proof of which is derived from 
the discovery, through the accounts, of its internal structural chaos. 
Revisionists have not spent much time explaining their neglect 
of institutional factors in entrepreneurial behavior. What they have 
said, however, boils down to a two point justification. First, they 
accept the dictum that the market is the primary force in economic 
life. They contend that, with sufficient demand, a skilled supply of 
capable entrepreneurs will be forthcoming in a modern economy. 
Or, to quote Professor Habbakuk's well-known appeal to demand 
theory, "Great generals are not made in times of peace; great 
entrepreneurs are not made in non-expanding industries."5 This 
dictum simply excludes the hypothesis of entrepreneurial failure 
causing economic decline, thus eliminating the necessity of bother-
ing with the matter. Second, as econometricians they have not 
found much merit in the socio-psychological or religious-institu-
tional explanations of economic activity, some of which, like the 
Weber-Tawney thesis, have in the past, gained great currency 
among historians. Accordingly they reject the idea that the British 
entrepreneur, for whatever particular reason, lost his elan. For 
them it has not been proved and is, with these sociological methods, 
probably unprovable, that Britain had a smaller pool of aggressive 
entrepreneurs in 1900 than in 1850. 
Both points are hardly indisputable. No evidence exists that great 
entrepreneurs cannot be made during periods of contracting or 
static markets. On the contrary, favorable marketing conditions can 
permit less capable entrepreneurs to survive quite well. When the 
crunch comes, when entrepreneurs are forced to compete fiercely 
in a shrinking market they have to show ingenuity. More than one 
industrial empire has been made under these conditions. A demand 
supremacy theory, moreover, automatically raises questions about 
the relationship between supply and demand. Institutionalists prob-
ably would concede that individual talent existed in equal measure 
in Britain at different times. The problem is that individual talent 
has to be expressed effectively. If a firm, an industry, or an economy 
is not organized to provide the entrepreneur with information appro-
priate to a high level of management excellence, and if it does not 
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have the organizational wherewithal to act on this information, then 
the brightest and most capable individual will be frustrated. To 
argue that Britain had plenty of bright young people about misses 
the point since defective business organization and administration 
could have prevented proper utilization of individual skills. This 
was true, above all, when, during the second industrial revolution, 
industry's technological and managerial needs could no longer 
be satisfied in traditional ways, e.g., through in shop training. 
Demand theorists would probably concede that individual talent is 
wasted in a badly organized business but they would contend that 
the market creates the organizational milieu. Institutionalists would 
counter that, in this case, supply creates its own demand. But there 
is no need to counter dictum with dictum. The question can only 
be answered, if at all, by historical investigation, for either view, 
depending on the specific historical context, could be correct. 
The problem, however, is that econometric methods hinder rather 
than abet this practical inquiry. McCloskey stated this clearly in the 
following exchange with Professor David S. Landes. The issue was 
the poor productivity of British coal mines, which McCloskey, in a 
paper, attributed to unfavorable geological formations, that is, to a 
natural instead of a human cause. 
McCloskey: The purpose of the paper is to estimate the 
magnitude of the geological effect. The argu-
ment, then, is that once these have been 
properly measured there is no residual pro-
ductivity difference to be examined by 
entrepreneurship. 
Landes: He objected to precisely this residual pro-
cedure. If one started with the entrepreneurial 
explanation, one could exclude geological 
conditions just as well. . . . 
McCloskey: . . .If one does start with the entrepreneurial 
hypothesis, there are no guides as to how to 
put the argument in quantitative form.6 
Mathematical historians are quantifiers. As quantifiers they have 
concentrated on productivity indices, profits, and costs. Since the 
creation of managerial structures cannot be examined quantitatively 
within the framework of neoclassical economic theory, the subject 
has had to be dropped. To ignore a subject because it is in-
significant is not the same thing as to claim it is insignificant 
because it does not fit into an explanatory model, even if the model 
is deemed "sufficient." 
3
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This does not mean the revisionist distrust of sociological-institu-
tional explanations of history is unfounded. Tough minded thinkers 
have preferred to shy away from the cause and effect quagmire 
characteristic of most psychological and sociological explanations 
of economic activity. Economics has, in this respect, been a much 
more compelling auxiliary. This is why the New Economic History 
has made such headway. There is nothing, however, that is soft 
minded about managerial accounting. It deals with the institutional-
ization of modern management practices and it provides the method 
through which this institutionalization process can be studied. It 
permits the historian to measure the importance of the institutional 
factor in entrepreneurial performance in a manner that mathe-
matical history, as practiced by the revisionists, does not. Indeed, 
because these revisionists have restricted their work to quantifiable 
costs, profit, and productivity factors, they have been able only to 
look at (some) of the results of entrepreneurial activity, not at 
entrepreneurial activity itself. 
Cost accounting theory and practice, then, is quite germane to 
the debate about British entrepreneurship because accounting be-
came an element essential to successful management after 1880. 
Superiority or inferiority in cost accounting meant superior or 
inferior entrepreneurial performance. The question is, therefore, how 
did British accounting fare? Unfortunately an answer to this question 
is not immediately forthcoming because the subject has been 
handled with confusion in most histories of British accounting. 
Although accounting historians generally agree that the British 
trailed behind the Americans after World War I, they also invariably 
claim that the British led the world in cost accounting before 1900. 
This lead has always been explained indirectly, usually by stressing 
the facts that accounting acquired professional status early in 
Britain and that British writers dominated in cost accounting theory. 
Neither contention, however, really proves that British industry ever 
led in cost accounting. Although accounting undoubtedly acquired 
a solid professional standing much earlier in Britain than elsewhere, 
cost accounting did not benefit therefrom. In fact the opposite was 
probably true. An analysis of materials published in The Incorporated 
Accountants' Journal in the year 1875 revealed for example that 
nearly all the leading articles are on points raised in bank-
ruptcy law and practice, and the other pages are devoted 
to reports of law cases on bankruptcy. . . . Hardly a word 
in the old papers about taxation, costing, statistical 
records; relatively little about utility companies or even 
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about ordinary joint-stock companies: practically nothing 
about that very important subject of recent years, the Hold-
ing Company, and nothing at all about mechanical ac-
counting.7 
The British accounting profession engaged almost exclusively at 
that time in financial not cost accounting. It was, in fact, a liberal 
profession made up of independent wealthy businessmen who did 
not work directly for industry but acted as consultants, working 
out of their own offices, much as lawyers do. The chartered or in-
corporated accountants, moreover, were not even exposed to cost 
accounting during their training, for as young "articled" clerks 
they were apprenticed to accounting offices instead of formally 
educated in colleges or universities. They could only learn what 
happened in the offices and, since the accountants seldom dealt 
with costing matters neither did the apprentices. The clerks who 
kept cost records in British industry were not chartered or in-
corporated accountants. They were poor, badly educated men who 
received what training they got on the job in a factory bookkeeping 
office. They hardly ever came into professional contact with public 
accountants who, in any case, despised them because of their lower 
class origins. Indeed public accountants did not consider these 
industrial cost accountants to be engaged in accounting. J. M. Fells 
remarked in 1910, 
It is now some 23 years or so ago that my friend Mr. Emile 
Garcke and I, in the flush of our youth, wrote the first 
pioneering book on this subject. Then it seemed to be 
thought by some that we had written a book on economics, 
and not one on accountancy. The Accountant, which per-
forms a most useful service in always representing the 
average mind of the profession, pointed out that the work 
was rather concerned with the wages and time books, 
stock books, and matters of a similar nature, which, as a 
rule did not come within the scope of an accountant's 
duties.8 
Because of this isolation the public accounting profession probably 
ignored cost accounting long after its practice should have at-
tracted notice. This neglect, moreover, had serious repercussions 
throughout British business because the professional accounting 
societies decided what subjects would be covered in the account-
ing examinations that the "articled" clerks had to pass. Business-
men, engineers, or progressive minded politicians could ask for 
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greater emphasis on cost accounting in the training of young ac-
countants but unless the accountants agreed nothing could be 
done. And the accountants were set in their ways. 
The literature which affirms Britain's early lead in cost account-
ing treats the subject exclusively in terms of theoretical develop-
ment. The assumption is made, therefore, that superiority in theory 
meant superiority in practice. Nobody, however, has thoroughly 
studied cost accounting practice in British business. Nonetheless 
the available evidence, which consists of contemporary observations 
made by accountants on both sides of the Atlantic, clearly indicates 
that no correlation existed. On the contrary, J. M. Fells, Britian's 
leading cost accountant around 1900, commented about the back-
wardness of English practice. 
There is no branch of accountancy that calls for higher 
qualifications or a more mature experience than cost ac-
counting; yet it would be no exaggeration to state that so 
far as the United Kingdom is concerned, proper systems 
of costing are the exception rather than the rule, and where 
they exist they are seldom supervised by professional ac-
countants. We have at last almost outgrown the amateur 
auditor—at all events, so far as important business under-
takings are concerned—but the impression still prevails 
that professional accountants would be unable to offer 
any practical assistance in connection with cost accounts, 
the most intricate branch of business accounting.9 
Fells, a consultant who had a special interest in promoting cost 
accounting, could be accused perhaps of beating his own tub. 
But rather patriotic Englishmen who were not ready to admit any 
inferiority to Americans said the same thing. Thus when American 
accountants in 1907 claimed they excelled in accounting technology, 
the editor of The Incorporated Accountants' Journal politely but 
firmly denied the charge. Nonetheless, although strongly defending 
British accounting practice, he reluctantly admitted: "As regards 
costing, the Americans, with some degree of justification, claim to 
have led the way—that is to say, they have succeeded in getting it 
more generally adopted."10 
British accountants equally stressed the harmful effects that 
poor cost accounting had on British industry. One accountant, a 
Mr. Rider, wrote shortly after the turn of the century that he had 
been able to analyze various competitive bids submitted by English 
firms (the figures were taken from a series of articles on "estima-
ting" in The Engineer). The result, he concluded, 
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is rather humiliating reading for commercial men, partic-
ularly when we remember how English manufacturers have 
recently been thrust to one side again and again on this 
particular class of work by foreign competition. They prove 
one thing most conclusively, namely, that in most, if not 
all, of the establishments submitting the tenders reviewed 
in the articles, there can either have been no intelligent 
consecutive system of Cost Accounts, or the estimating 
staff, being (as is usually the case) highly technical, had 
considered any information compiled by clerks as not 
worth taking into account.11 
Negative comment was not reserved for older industries which 
could be suspected of using antiquated bookkeeping. Fells ob-
served, for instance, that the electrical firm Edison and Swan Ltd. 
had failed to integrate its financial and cost accounting. 
There £56,000 had been carried forward in the balance-
sheet as representing the value of certain work supposed 
to be in progress, which had in reality been finished for 
a number of years. . . . I contend that had the ordinary 
books of account not merely been supplemented by, but 
absolutely considered in conjunction with the manufac-
turing books of the concern, such a mistake could not 
possibly have happened.12 
Similar quotations can be given, moreover, to illustrate how 
American superiority in cost accounting permitted American in-
dustry to operate more efficiently than British. Fells, who had 
studied American and British railroad accounting closely, com-
mented that "the accountant," the "goods manager," the "general 
manager and everybody else" in the British Northeastern Railway 
Company 
agreed on one thing, viz., that they could no more "spot" 
where the increase had arisen in the passenger traffic 
than they could "spot" the decrease in the goods traffic. 
This is not at all a desirable state of things. It is very 
different from the manner in which the American railway 
companies' accounts are kept. Everybody knows that Mr. 
Pierpont Morgan, when he first took the railway companies 
of the United States in hand, gathered together and studied 
very exhaustively all the statistics he could get at, and, as 
a result he pointed out that by increase in rates or de-
crease in cost of one-tenth of a penny per ton per mile 
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the companies would receive some £60,000 or £70,000 a 
year more. And if one looks at the elaborate accounts of 
these companies one can see what a great advantage 
these administrators have over administrators in this 
country.13 
Some years later another English accountant remarked about 
American steel companies: 
A study of the great American iron businesses of the past, 
culminating in the formation of the well-known Steel Trust, 
is interesting, as disclosing how close costing was, and is, 
employed by the steel kings in watching the management 
of their concerns, and the position of a departmental 
manager, whose production and costs were falling below 
standard, seems to have been no bed of roses. 'Make good 
or go' is a hard precept to work to.14 
Rawlinson went on to say that "many great works" in England had 
their own cost accounting departments, with separate sets of 
offices, that prepared periodic reports on the costs of production 
by department. Their weekly and monthly reports enabled manage-
ment to eliminate many cost inefficiencies in a firm's operations.15 
But he concluded that Americans applied cost accounting tech-
nology more intensively within the firm and more extensively 
throughout industry than did the British and they used the informa-
tion provided in order to cut costs.16 
Accountants drew this picture just before World War I, when ac-
counting technology was almost exclusively preoccupied with actual 
costs. British performance did not improve relative to the United 
States after standard costs and budgeting assumed importance in 
the new technology (beginning during World War I). Indeed it got 
worse, for the British even lost their claim to theoretical superiority. 
One leading accountant, Lord Stamp, described the theoretical 
laggardness in 1925: 
English accounting practice has been developing for 
many years, but it has not made any substantive contribu-
tion to economic science over its own field of analysis of 
the results of industry, although it has practically a monop-
oly grip of the required data. Accountants have the figures; 
other people cannot use them and if accountants will not, 
then we get nothing; economics continues its abstract 
declarations and business blunders on by individual 
instinct.17 
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The most imaginative work in standard costing, budgeting, and uni-
form costing was done elsewhere. The point, however, need not be 
pursued since it is not disputed. 
Because British cost accounting technology remained relatively 
backward, the historian cannot, by studying Britain alone, determine 
what factors were responsible for the retardation. That would be 
like searching for the causes of something that did not happen. 
Work can be done, however, comparatively, by looking for and at 
similar institutions in Britain, after they have been identified as 
causal factors in a country where cost accounting theory and 
practice has flourished. Both America and Germany qualify in this 
respect. American cost accountants have studied their own experi-
ence the most; indeed they, with rare exceptions, seem to think that 
cost accounting is an Anglo-American institution.18 
Inasmuch as accounting historians usually confine their analysis 
to the English speaking world and its literature, relatively little has 
been said in America about the impressive theoretical and practical 
work done in Germany on cost accounting.19 Although theoretical 
contributions were made by many intelligent men, a look at the 
work of a giant among them, Professor Eugen Schmalenbach, 
suffices to illustrate the theoretical development. Schmalenbach, an 
accountant by training, realized in the late 19th century that ac-
counting was an applied science and he devoted a lifetime, as a 
professor in Cologne, to perfecting this business technology. He 
was among the first to recognize the digressive, progressive, and 
proportional nature of costs, and that technological factors, e.g., 
plant size, equipment, speed of output, unit and lot size, as well 
as production factors, e.g., variations in volume of output, deter-
mined costs. He even constructed a management decision model 
which, based on marginal cost theory, set minimal production costs 
(or optimal profit levels) in a firm.20 Schmalenbach emphasized the 
uselessness of historical costs, thereby anticipating standard cost 
accounting and forecasting.21 He, in the 1920s, worked up the 
charts of accounts and flow charts which became the basis of 
uniform accounting, not only in Germany but throughout conti-
nental Europe. This German professor, then, "took cost theory 
beyond its descriptive stage."22 For him accounting was a tool 
which, as he explained when developing the concept of a "dynamic 
balance sheet," enabled management in private or public enter-
prises to achieve maximum efficiency.23 
Many of Schmalenbach's ideas sparked intense debate among 
professional accountants, accounting professors, and accounting 
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students in Germany. His concept of progressive, regressive, and 
proportional costs was subjected to detailed analysis and found 
wanting; his decision model was rejected as impractical. The point 
is not, however, that Schmalenbach was wrong but that the 
academic and accounting community, under his influence, debated 
the essential features of management accounting. This debate 
began a decade before the First World War and continued through 
the conflict unabated. Then in the 1920s there began 
research on a portentous scale; dozens of scholars oc-
cupied only with scientific work, textbooks, and mono-
graphs; a half-dozen or more periodicals and a well-trained 
staff of considerable size busied with the theoretical and 
practical problems of the newly-created 'Betriebswirt-
schaftslehre.'24 
German business economics became the most theoretically oriented 
in the world, and cost accounting theory was an important part of 
German business economics. Indeed before World War I it was 
business economics in Germany. As a result German academic 
accountants made significant contributions to the science of cost 
accounting. Their work in value theory was unparalleled in its 
analytical sophistication and their contributions to uniform cost 
accounting theory were equally unrivaled. 
From the beginning Germans never forgot that theory had little 
meaning unless it affected industrial practice. Schmalenbach cer-
tainly conceived of accounting as an applied science. Between 1906 
and 1914 his periodical, the Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche 
Forschung, regularly published articles, written by working cost 
accountants and engineers, that described current industrial ac-
counting procedures. The war and the defeat, moreover, triggered 
a fundamental reevaluation of German industry that culminated in 
the "rationalization" movement of the postwar era. Most descriptions 
of the movement concentrate on the 1920s, but, as far as cost 
accounting is concerned, it really began with the cost accounting 
renaissance in German industry shortly after 1900 and ended with 
the Nazi efforts to implement a uniform system of modern cost 
accounting in German industry in the late 1930s.25 
German achievements in cost accounting technology, therefore, 
cannot be denied. But what about the institutions which succored 
this development? First there were business factors. German in-
dustry tended quite early to be integrated into large-scale organiza-
tions. The big German banks, with state encouragement, fostered 
10
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this integration. These banks, which were ". . .a combination of 
commercial bank, investment bank and investment trust. . . 
functioned as middlemen between the investing public and in-
dustry because they took". . .the stocks and bonds [of a company] 
and tried to place them with the public."26 Improved cost account-
ing developed out of this relationship. In effect, the banks, as 
middlemen, assumed a great responsibility towards the investor. 
They needed, therefore, to have reliable information about the 
financial status and business performance (both actual and potential) 
of the firms in which they took an interest. The banks, therefore, 
recruited and trained their own staffs of auditors, men, who, be-
cause they were interested in the industrial as well as the financial 
performance of their clients, had to be trained cost accountants. 
Through their work banks became cost accounting catalysts. 
Auditors pressed customers into adopting improved accounting 
systems. Indeed, when a bank held a company's stock in its in-
vestment portfolio, its auditors insisted that the client firm imple-
ment management control oriented cost accounting.27 Thus in-
stitutionalized interaction between banks and industry fostered cost 
accounting. 
This interaction, moreover, was characteristic of German business 
structure. Such bodies as the German Machine Manufacturers or 
the Rheinisch-Westphalian Coal Selling Syndicate needed good 
cost accounting technology in order to operate their cartels effi-
ciently. All of the cartels had "their standing committees on ac-
counting and costing problems and laid down uniform systems for 
their members."28 The German trade associations for heavy and 
light industry (Zentralverband Deutscher Industrieller, founded in 
1875, and the Bund der Industriellen, founded in 1895) also 
acted as originators as well as clearinghouses for ideas 
in the field of industrial accounting. The original purpose 
of this collaboration was mutual assistance and better 
understanding between members of the same industry. 
[But] it . . . gradually developed into a comprehensive 
technical advice system, whereby each accountant work-
ing in a particular trade or industry [could] call upon the 
combined experience of his fellow.29 
There is no doubt that "[t]he more rigid and comprehensive organi-
zation of industries in Germany," as an English cost accounting 
expert remarked, "in cartels, syndicates, combines and similar 
organizations has been instrumental in evolving unified methods of 
control."30 
11
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State supported educational institutions also promoted cost ac-
counting. Although noneconomic in the sense that they were state 
created, these educational institutions had direct—e.g., professors 
worked as industrial consultants—contacts with private business 
as well as indirect ones through the quasi-economic professional 
associations formed to promote the interests of their graduates. Two 
sets of institutions, with associated professional societies, existed. 
There were the Technische Hochschulen which had grown up dur-
ing the nineteenth century.31 By 1900 they numbered an impressive 
eleven within the German Empire. Although education in these 
schools had been exclusively technical, the professors, some of 
whom were industrialists themselves, had grown conscious during 
the last two decades of the 19th century of the need for engineers 
to acquire management skills. Perspicacious engineers realized 
that the new American challenge arose less from a technical than 
a managerial superiority.32 This led them to scientific management 
and cost accounting. Indeed the Association of German Engineers 
(Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, VDI), to which many of these pro-
fessors belonged, devoted an entire meeting in 1912 to the scientific 
management movement in America.33 Professors in the Technische 
Hochschulen, representatives from the VDI and from industry, many 
of whom were graduates from Technische Hochschulen, and civil 
servants, reviewing technical education, specifically urged that 
greater emphasis be placed on cost accounting and business ad-
ministration in the Technische Hochschulen.34 The first cost ac-
counting courses were introduced there before the war. During the 
first decade of the 20th century, moreover, numerous cost account-
ing studies written by professors in and graduates from the 
Technische Hochschulen, were published.35 Thereafter Betriebswirt-
schaftslehre (theory of business economics) became a standard 
preoccupation of professors and students. 
The Handelshochschulen (Business Schools) belonged to the 
second set of institutions, the creation of which was even more 
important in the development of cost accounting than the first. 
The first Handelshochschule started in Leipzig in 1898, a second 
in Cologne (1901), a third in Frankfurt am Main (1901), a fourth in 
Berlin (1906), a fifth in Mannheim (1908), a sixth in Munich (1910), 
a seventh in Königsberg (1915), an an eighth in Nürnberg (1920). 
Two of them, Cologne and Frankfurt, formed the nucleus of univer-
sities which grew up in these significant commercial centers.36 The 
professors in these new schools, not those in the older universities 
and Technische Hochschulen, made business economics into a 
respected applied science. Men like Schmalenbach and Schmidt 
12
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 6 [1979], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol6/iss2/1
Locke: Cost Accounting: An Institutional Yardstick 13 
. .wrote all the literature of scientific value and directed all the 
scientific groups of scholars."37 The graduates from these schools, 
who entered commercial, banking, and industrial pursuits not only 
carried the idea of the professors with them but kept abreast of 
technical matters on their own. The Verband Deutscher Diplomkauf-
leute (Association of German Business School Graduates), which 
was organized to defend the group's professional interests, pub-
lished a series of technical books and a periodical (Der praktische 
Betriebswirt, The Practical Business Economist) which kept mem-
bers posted on cost accounting and related business technologies. 
Thus three streams—the Technische Hochschulen and the engi-
neering fraternities, the Handelschochschulen and their graduates, 
and the banks, industrial cartels, and trade associations—carried 
cost accounting into the German economy. These three streams, 
moreover, flowed together through the medium of the state bureau-
cracy. The interaction among these institutions manifested itself 
even before the First World War, when industrialists, city officials, 
and business school professors formed the Gesellschaft für 
wirtschaftliche Ausbildung, e. V. zu Frankfurt am Main (Society for 
Education in Efficiency, Frankfurt am Main) which propagated the 
latest business administrative and accounting techniques in a series 
of lecture courses especially intended for working engineers and 
plant managers.38 Professors and lecturers from various Handel-
shochschulen and Technische Hochschulen were active in this pro-
gram which, despite the Frankfurt designation in the organization's 
title, operated nationally. The institutional interaction was even 
greater after World War I. The Reichskuratorium für Wirtschaftlich-
keit, RKW (Reich Development Trust), with state money, drew in-
dustrial leaders, professors, and state officials together in its 
various committees in order to promote efficiency.39 Indeed in the 
1920s the RKW began, under Schmalenbach's guidance, to pub-
lish model charts for various German industries.40 In 1927, in its 
annual report, the RKW noted that 
systems of uniform bookkeeping had been completed and 
their adoption recommended in the following branches of 
industry: engineering; lignite production; breweries; tex-
tiles; tile manufacture, rubber industry; coal trade; whole-
sale paper trade; and freight shipping on the Rhine.41 
Finally the Nazi dictatorship profited from the same institutions 
when it carried through a general reform in uniform accounting 
during the 1930s. It is true that Eugen Schmalenbach, who had 
chaired the Reichsausschuss für Betriebswirtschaft (Central Man-
13
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agement Committee) of the RKW refused to serve the Nazis, but his 
influence, through his writings, his students, and his earlier work 
in the Rf.B was great. In fact, without the theoretical work of the 
professors, the full cooperation of thousands of trained accountant 
graduates from the business schools, and three decades of coopera-
tive work among business leaders, engineers, and accountants on 
various committees, the Nazis could not have begun the formidable 
task of implementing uniform accounting in Germany. 
The complex institutional supports that sustained the growth of 
cost accounting in Germany did not exist in Britain. Since big 
British banks did not finance industrialization they never developed 
a similar institutional relationship with British industry.42 London 
accounting firms, like Price Waterhouse, which became internation-
ally famous, did serve the needs of the financial and commercial 
community but, since the milieu was cut off from British manufac-
turing industries, the bookkeeping technology involved financial 
instead of industrial costing. British industry, moreover, never 
organized on the German scale. It was not compelled to implement 
the cost accounting control mechanisms that were unavoidable in 
larger, more rigid organizations. 
Nor did English educational institutions consciously promote cost 
accounting as part of a new management technology. Although an 
Institute of Works and Cost Accountants was founded (1919), it 
functioned along familiar lines—apprenticeship combined with In-
stitute administered examinations, for which apprentices prepared 
after work through self-study. The close connections between 
higher education and accounting that developed in Germany (and 
America) never took hold. Only in 1947 did "eleven of the larger 
universities, by agreement with the main accountancy bodies," begin 
a degree program in accountancy.43 But, since an accounting degree 
had a "vocational" bias, neither Oxford nor Cambridge accepted 
the scheme.44 Moreover, the accounting societies only agreed be-
cause the program perpetuated the apprenticeship system (after 2¾ 
years in the university a period of apprenticeship was required in 
order to receive a degree). This belated and halfhearted recognition 
of university work illustrates the reluctance of professional ac-
countants, embedded in their institutes, to recognize the importance 
of academic research and training. A few of the professionals saw 
the need, but, as a group, English accountants continued to mouth 
the old cliches about the superiority of apprenticeship over formal 
education. This attitude deprived British accounting of the research 
as well as the educational benefits which came from the German 
institutions. "This insistent practical urge " one apologist ad-
14
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mitted, "provoked a critic to declare that accountants were insensi-
tive to the need for sustained academic study and research. It is 
probable that a certain want of contact with the universities had 
something to do with this apparent neglect. . . ."45 
What the English education system failed to do specifically for 
accountants and cost accountants it also failed to do generally for 
English management. The tendency to bring Oxbridge men into 
management resulted in general ignorance of cost accounting at 
the top where old school ties counted for more than managerial 
skills. Even graduates with degrees in economics or business ad-
ministration (from the few British universities that eventually started 
such programs) did not possess the requisite knowledge because 
cost accounting was not part of the university curricula. Theoretical 
marcoeconomics, the glory of Britain, was the mainstay of education 
in economics and business. Nor were British engineers much better 
prepared in cost accounting. The long tradition of apprenticeship 
training, which marked British engineering, once again discouraged 
innovation. Engineering schools developed late and when they came 
engineering education was almost exclusively technical in nature. 
The men who organized the institutions did not seem to realize that 
modern industry needed industrial and management as well as 
academically trained electrical, chemical, and mechanical engineers. 
The engineering curricula in the colleges and higher technical 
schools were obsolescent, in comparison with the American and 
German, from the beginning. 
Nor did British government administrative and financial policies 
effectively improve cost accounting technology. British authorities, 
awaking to the backwardness of governmental cost accounting dur-
ing the First World War, introduced better cost accounting proce-
dures into the defense ministries.46 Moreover, they encouraged 
private industry to adopt better cost accounting. State action, how-
ever, never meant much. Company laws, which required annual 
audits in limited liability firms, encouraged better financial account-
ing. But cost accounting was not significantly affected thereby. Nor 
did the taxation laws indirectly improve costing, as they did in 
Germany. Whereas German law required corporations to pay taxes 
according to volume of sales and turnover, thereby demanding more 
accurate and complete accounts, English law only taxed profits. The 
British government's failure to promote effective uniform account-
ing methods was to prove especially significant. As the country re-
treated from competition to protectionism in the 20th century, 
British industry did not arm itself with the control mechanisms with 
which industrial efficiency could be assured after the spur of com-
15
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petition disappeared. The neglect had serious repercussions during 
the Second World War, for the British government, because of the 
diversity of accounting procedures within particular industries, had 
difficulty awarding and paying contracts. Without uniform cost ac-
counting nobody was in fact quite sure what the costs were. 
This essay on cost accounting development has ranged temporally 
over a broad span. The revisionist econometricians out to refurbish 
the image of the Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur might be 
tempted to say, therefore, that the critique has missed its mark. 
So what, for the sake of argument, if the Germans developed a better 
system of cost accounting than the British between 1900 and 1940? 
So what if the German entrepreneur outstripped the British during 
the same period of time? They have been studying the performance 
of the late Victorian and Edwardian entrepreneur. I believe, how-
ever, that the revisionists, by restricting their analysis to the pre-
1914 period have not understood the nature of the debate. Mc-
Closkey and Sandberg listed four specific charges which the 
pessimists have leveled against British industrialists: 
(1) They were bad salesmen, especially abroad. (2) They 
overinvested in old staple export industries, such as cotton 
and iron, and were slow to move into industries of the 
future, such as chemicals, automobiles, and electrical engi-
neering. (3) They underinvested in the laboratories and 
technical personnel required for the development and ex-
ploitation of applied science. (4) Most important, they 
failed to adopt in many industries the best available tech-
niques of production, such as ring spinning in cotton 
textiles, the Solvay process in chemical, mechanical cutting 
in coal, and a host of new techniques in iron and steel.47 
All four charges, except the first perhaps, highlight an economy 
undergoing a basic transformation. All imply that it is not the 
country's past achievements but its ability to adapt to future require-
ments that is the yardstick by which "economic" accomplishments 
have to be measured. Moreover all, except the first, are really state-
ments about the structure of an economy. Even the first can be so 
considered if salesmanship is viewed in terms of training and man-
agement systems. These are, by McCloskey and Sandberg's own 
admission, the charges that they, revisionists, have to refute. 
The problem is that, with their methods, the revisionists have been 
unable, especially when restricting the analytical time frame to the 
Victorian-Edwardian era, to deal with, much less refute, the four 
16
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propositions. In order to chart trends in costs, profits, and produc-
tivity the econometrician needs long runs of commercial and in-
dustrial statistics. He is forced, therefore, to study industries that 
have not only been around for some time but which have been 
considered important enough to warrant statistical compilation. The 
period was one of the most technologically innovative in history. 
The new industries, which were destined to replace the older staple 
industries, and which, therefore, were the most technologically ad-
vanced, economically dynamic, financially profitable, and structur-
ally creative during the second industrial revolution, were only on 
the threshold of their greatness at the turn of the century. Obviously 
the farther the econometricians push statistical runs from 1900 or 
from 1914 into the past the more they have been forced to deal with 
older industries. And the more they have been occupied with the 
older industries the less they have been able to study the British 
entrepreneur during a period of transformation. S. B. Saul, when 
reviewing the work of the new economic historians at the Harvard 
Conference in 1970, noticed this limitation. "The Conference papers 
were restricted to discussions of the older industries," he remarked 
"even Floud's machine tool firm was definitely not of the new gener-
ation. What of the newer industries?"48 
The statistical method, however, limits the revisionists treatment 
of the old industries too. Economic historians tend to believe that 
the old industries (iron, textiles, shipbuilding) suffered from a first 
start handicap by the end of the nineteenth century. That may be 
true, but there is no inexorable law of economic development which 
makes it so. If an early start means that an industry is later auto-
matically saddled with obsolescent plant and equipment then the 
German chemical and electrical industries would have, in the 20th 
century, to have been, because of their earlier start, inferior to those 
of the British. The question is not so much which industry started 
first as which was capable of constant adaptation and innovation. 
The question is about industrial potential, c. 1914, not industrial 
accomplishments. To examine "potential" the institutional infrastruc-
ture of industry has to be taken into account; for, if it is inadequate 
during a period of industrial transformation, that industry's ability 
to modernize its managerial and productive structure will be ad-
versely affected.49 British entrepreneurs operated quite well in the 
financial and managerial milieu of the first industrial revolution. 
They had serious difficulties, however, adapting to the technological 
and organizational demands of the second. The revisionists, with 
their backward looking statistical runs on costs, profits, and pro-
ductivity, have really ignored this essential point. That is why cost 
17
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accounting is so useful. It is both method and object of research; 
method because it provides the historian with analytical tools which 
deal with structure during a period of structural change; object 
because it is an essential part of the subject under investigation. A 
study of its development shows that the econometric revisionist 
optimistic evaluation of the British entrepreneur, circa 1914, is mis-
placed. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 17-28. 
2Floud, p. 329. 
3Floud, p. 318. 
4Floud maintains that "although the financial administration of the firm was se-
verely criticized after 1890, no similar criticisms were made of the quality of 
work." Floud, p. 318. Good workmanship does not, of course, mean good pro-
ductivity, low costs, or acceptable profits. 
5Habakkuk, p. 212. 
6McCloskey, Essays, p. 309. 
7Jones, p. 182. 
8Fells, The Accountancy, p. 69. Also see, Emile Garcke and J. M. Fells, Factory. 
9Fells, The Accountancy, p. 70. 
10English, p. 193. 
11Rider, p. 178. 
12Showell, p. 63. Fells' remarks follow a speech made by A. E. Showell. 
13Showell, p. 63. Fells is quoting a man named Joseph Pease, who was head of 
the Northeastern Railway Company. 
14Rawlinson, p. 265. 
15Rawlinson, p. 265. 
16Rawlinson, p. 265. 
17Murphy, p. 43. 
18Thus Gardner and Littleton stay almost exclusively in the Anglo-American 
world. A. A. Garrett, in an article "Accounting Research, An International Func-
tion," only deals with the Commonwealth, the United States, and the United King-
dom. David Solomons in "The Historical Development of Costing," mentions Ger-
many in a short footnote. 
19Hanns-Martin W. Schoenfeld, who has written one of the few studies in English 
on German cost accounting states that ". . . relatively little work has been done to 
make known and to utilize in the United States scholarly ideas which have been 
generated in Europe—which in industrialization and business research is second 
only to the United States. Since central European ideas have had some—and oc-
casionally considerable—influence on the field of business administration in Japan, 
in certain countries in Eastern Europe, in South America, and in the rest of the in-
dustrialized world, scholars in accounting and related fields should have an oppor-
tunity to become familiar with this approach." Schoenfeld, p. v. 
20Schoenfeld, p. 52. 
21Schoenfeld, p. 52. 
22Schoenfeld, p. 52. 
23The best way to get familiar with Schmalenbach is through his periodical, 
Zeitschrift für handelswissenschaftliche Forschung. He started it in 1906 and wrote 
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many of the articles, and, during the first fifteen years, all the book reviews him-
self. The ideas in his books appeared first in articles in this periodical and often 
quite early. Also see the recent biography in English, Forrester, Schmalenbach 
and After. 
24Schranz, p. 279. 
25Brady (The Rationalization) is still the authoritative work. For the extension 
into the Nazi period see Singer and Abel. 
26Abel, p. 32. 
27Abel, p. 33. 
28Abel, p. 35. 
29Abel, p. 35. 
30Singer, p. 13. 
31See Manegold and Lexis. For a comparison between French and German 
technical universities see Locke. 
32Two works by the influential Professor Alois Riedler of the technical Hoch-
schule in Charlottenburg are important (Ein Rückblick and Emil Rathenau). Also 
see his Zur Frage and Unsere Hochschulen. Other professors of note are Otto 
Kammerer (see his Verhandlungen) and Georg Schlesinger (see Selbstkosten-
berechnung). 
33Fifty-fourth general meeting of the VDI held in Leipzig. American advocates 
of the "Taylor-System" were in attendance. See, James M. Dodge, Industrielle 
and Georg Schlesinger, Betriebsführung—two speeches given at the meeting. Tay-
lor's work was also translated into German, often by these professors. See, Fred-
erick Winslow Taylor, Die Grundsätze, which was translated by Professor Rudolf 
Roesler of the technical Hochschule in Aachen. 
34Abhandlungen. Of articles in this report see especially, Dr. von Wiese, Die 
wirtschafts- und staatswissenschaftlichen Studien. 
35Two important works, at the beginning of this flood of books, were J. Lilienthal, 
Fabrikorganisation, and Albert Ballewski, Der Fabrikbetrieb. 
36See works by Redlich, Eckert, Devinat, Schmidt, Isaac, and Mantsuranis. 
37See works by Schranz, Matz and Schmaltz, The Business. 
38Founded in 1903. 
39Beginning as a private organization (1921), it did not get very far until reor-
ganized and financed by the state (1926). 
40Abel, p. 36. 
41Two accountants, G. W. Murphy and E. S. Most, who translated one of 
Schmalenbach's books, said of him: "It is no exaggeration to state that he trans-
formed the German accountancy profession by operating a revolution in the atti-
tude of businessmen to accountancy, as much as by inducing accountants them-
selves to extend their vision and their range of activities." (Schmalenbach, 
Dynamic Accounting, p. 5) 
42British industrialization was financed by individuals, by local banks, and by 
reinvestment of profits. Although London was a great financial center, it was in-
volved more in commercial loans and portfolio investments (e.g., state bonds, rail-
road and mining securities). Whether or not British industry lacked capital because 
of London's failure to invest in home industries is a controversial subject. Some 
feel that sufficient money was available from other sources, but the fact that the 
big British financial institutions generally ignored home industries is not ques-
tioned. 
43Byrd, p. 37. 
44Byrd, p. 37. 
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45Bray, Recent, p. 199. Also see Bray, The English. In 1911 a Mr. James Pater-
son of Glasgow told an Assembly of Incorporated Accountants: "I find, and I 
think it is the experience of all who have carefully examined the cases that came 
under their notice, that a student who has been in a good office, and who has the 
natural ability to assimilate what he sees and reads, makes a better accountant 
than the man who starts off with the halo of a University education (Applause). 
I think that our method of examination, subject to certain qualifications, is a far 
better test than even a degree in economics in the Berlin University. (Hear, hear) 
We get far better results from a practical examination than from one in mere the-
ory." Nelson, p. 20. This attitude persisted in the profession through World War II. 
46Grimwood, pp. 114-20. 
47McCloskey and Sandberg, p. 92. The list of charges is repeated in McCloskey, 
p. 4. 
48Saul, p. 396. 
4 9An excellent description of management's preparation (in research, develop-
ment, and marketing) against obsolescence can be found in Sydney H. Higgins, 
Dyeing. Higgins wrote this study after a lengthy tour of factories in various coun-
tries. The chapter on color production is especially interesting because of the 
future orientation of the German dyeing industry. Indeed as management became 
more future oriented it became less susceptible to obsolescence. Members of the 
Anglo-American management accounting team who visited the USA in 1950 were 
amazed to find American manufacturers discontinuing product lines or replacing 
plant and equipment that were perfectly "good" on the grounds that market and 
production forecasting showed they had no future. 
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